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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

*Record*

*OE 7482-1881*

*AFAC*

9 August 1982

Ms. Ellie Vogtmann  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

REFERENCE: Classification Review of Galley Proofs of 1960 Executive  
Sessions Being Prepared for Foreign Relations Committee's  
"Historical Series"

Dear Ellie:

The Classification Review Division has determined that the portions of the January 21, 1960 -- Galley 79 pages 65-66, 75 and 90 of Allen Dulles' testimony and intelligence estimates may be declassified. We have received concurrence from the CIA DDI Information Review Officer to the declassification and release of the above portions as checked on the galleys.

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Enclosures



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7/15/82



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

JULY 12 1982

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of March 31 requesting the Department's review of galley proofs of executive sessions held in 1960 which are being prepared for publication in the next volume of the Foreign Relations Committee's "Historical Series".

We have reviewed the galley proofs enclosed with your letter and have no objection to their declassification and publication except for the bracketed material on galley proof pages noted as follows, which we recommend remain classified and protected in the interest of national defense or foreign policy:

[ January 21, 1960 - Galley 79. We recommend the Central Intelligence Agency be consulted regarding release of Allen Dulles' testimony and intelligence estimates on Galleys 65-66, 75 and 90. ] ✓

February 18, 1960 - (previously excised material) - Galleys 137, 143 and 159.

February 25, 1960 - No objection to release. Galley 42, line 14, spelling "Tsarapkin" instead of "Sir Opton".

April 21, 1960 - No objection to release.

June 7, 1960 - Galley 52.

June 10, 1960 - No objection to release.

June 23, 1960 - Galley 98.


August 11, 1960 - No objection to release.

Appendix A - No objection to release.

It is my understanding that officers of the Department have been directly in touch with your staff concerning this review. I regret the delay in responding to your request.

With cordial regards,

Sincerely,

  
Powell A. Moore  
Assistant Secretary  
for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:  
Galley proofs

The Honorable  
Charles H. Percy,  
Chairman,  
Committee on Foreign Relations,  
United States Senate.

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testified to a 3-to-1 ICBM gap last year, he was operating on the basis of what the Russians are capable of doing.

On the basis of what surely must be the same intelligence, one of our most respected intelligence officers seems to arrive at a different view than does the Secretary of Defense, and I wondered if you could enlighten us a bit and remove some of this confusion that seems to have arisen.

Secretary HERTER: Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you a clear-cut answer to that.

The intelligence community makes estimates from time to time, which are submitted to us, and among the estimates that they have made—and which have been revised from time to time—have been those not alone of capability, which is one thing, but of strength and intention to increase the strength.

I suspect that the variation that has occurred is between the intelligence estimate of capability. We know that the Soviets have developed booster strength far ahead of ours.

We have concentrated in our missiles program on as great a distance as the Russians, but with a smaller payload, and we did that deliberately when we first began our missiles program because we felt that we could send the same impact with a smaller payload that would be just as great as theirs would be with a much larger payload.

The question of what they have put into mass production is, at best, guesswork.

Mr. Khrushchev made some statements of his own that he had just visited a plant of mass production which has already turned out 250 rockets. He did not say what size they were, whether they were ICBM's or IRBM's, or what type of rockets they were.

The intelligence community, I think, is in full agreement that they cannot have any such number in hand at the present time.

The intelligence community keeps reviewing these matters, and I think they have felt, knowing what the manufacturing difficulties of ICBM's are, that while the capability is there to produce large numbers, the actual numbers that have been produced are not as great as they estimated a year before. That, I think, is based largely on our own experience in the difficulties of mass production.

#### CONFUSING STATEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. It is very confusing to me—

Secretary HERTER. It is confusing to me, sir. I made exactly the same inquiry that you have asked of me this morning, because I had seen Mr. Dulles' testimony, and I sensed there was a difference in evaluation of the two things.

I cannot pretend to be an authority on this subject. Certainly the intelligence community has been asked to keep working on this continuously. They have to operate, as you know, from rather meager information.

The CHAIRMAN. On the contrary, Mr. Dulles gave the impression that he was quite confident of his information, much more so than usual. ✓

He mentioned some defectors that we had seen, and he had charts to show that they had launched a number of these missiles,

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and so on. I thought he had much greater assurance, that he knew what he was talking about; he gave me that impression.

He may be wrong, of course, and he kept referring to the intelligence community. He certainly is a major part of it.

What I am confused about mostly is this concept of the Secretary of Defense that there is some new standards by which he measures this. It is sort of like saying this difference between a 1940 dollar and a 1954 dollar.

He has revised the basic approach to this, which confuses me. Why has he done that?

Secretary HERTER. Sir, I cannot give you the answer to that. I think that the basic difference is in an estimate of capacity. We might well estimate our own capacity for battleship building—

The CHAIRMAN. You mean manufacturing capacity?

Secretary HERTER. Yes, manufacturing capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. Not explosive capacity.

Secretary HERTER. That is right; manufacturing capacity, mass production.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator SPARKMAN. The thing that puzzles me about that is this: Mr. Dulles certainly is not basing his estimate on any potential. He talked about what they had on the launching pads.

The CHAIRMAN. What they already shot.

Senator SPARKMAN. What they shot, and how many they had on the launching pads ready to go. Now, I just do not see how there could be any difference.

Senator LAUSCHE. I thought he answered my question of the intercontinental missile by saying that they had 10 available for firing.

Senator SPARKMAN. On the launching pads, that is exactly what I am saying. He gave the specific number that they had ready to go like that.

Secretary HERTER. That I would not quarrel with at all. I do not think that Secretary Gates would quarrel with that.

Senator SPARKMAN. But here is the thing about it.

Secretary HERTER. It is a question of the estimate from there on out as to what they have available now.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right.

I asked Mr. Dulles this question, and he very properly declined to answer; in fact, I really did not expect him to answer. I asked him how many we had on the launching pad.

Now, just about a year ago, Secretary McElroy, testifying before the Joint Economic Committee, said that we would have 3 on the launching pad by July 1, 1959.

When July 1, 1959, came along, I believe the testimony before the Armed Services Committee was that we did not have any; and I am not sure we have any yet, but it looks like we could get some comparison between those two.

#### MILITARY EVALUATIONS OF THE SOVIETS

The CHAIRMAN. And, Mr. Secretary, I may be misinterpreting, reading something into this that may not be there, but he seems to

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**SOVIET ICBM'S**

I do not want to go back to this missile gap or so forth, but I have been looking at Mr. Dulles' testimony. I do not want to belabor the point, but while it is fresh in our minds, I might say that he said this:

The conclusion of the United States Intelligence Board—and on this we are unanimous—is that the present Soviet ICBM program would provide some 140 to 200 ICBM's on launchers in mid-1961. This would assume a total inventory of between 175 and 270, and a total production of some 225 to 350.

And then later on he gave this definite number of 10 at the present time on their launching pads, and gave the number that they had test-fired—I believed he said they had test-fired 15. He said they felt they were quite accurate on the 15, and that they were close to certain of the 10 now on the launching pads.

I do not care about discussing that further, but while I had this before me I wanted to tell you about that.

Secretary HERTER. Yes.

**PANAMA: FLYING THE FLAG**

Senator SPARKMAN. One little thing: You said something a while ago in talking about Panama about the flag incident.

I believe I heard over the radio, or read somewhere, that one solution for this difficulty with the Republic of Panama was that they were about to agree to fly the Panamanian flag side by side with the American flag over the Panama Canal area.

We had not made any such decision as that, had we?

Secretary HERTER. Not at all; no, sir. As I was saying earlier, I have not even a recommendation in front of me at the moment to present to the President.

Senator SPARKMAN. I noticed you said that, yes.

Now, the House committee today reported out a resolution, I understand. Are you familiar with that resolution?

Secretary HERTER. I am not sure which one. There were two different ones.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, they reported out a resolution that, as I understand it, seems to say that there should be no departure from the treaty features with Panama unless it was agreed to by treaty, ratified by the Senate of the United States.

Secretary HERTER. I know that in testimony before the House committee, representatives of the State Department have said that we would be taking or recommending no action in this matter without consultation with them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

I was a little taken aback when I heard about the resolution that had come out, but I believe it said the committee reported it out unanimously, and it should be taken as an indication of how the members of that committee have reacted to it.

**SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS**

Now, I want to ask you one question about the Soviet Union and its nuclear test proposals.

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It is a very primitive country, and hard to get about. The road systems are miserable, and one of the things we are going to move on, I hope quickly, is to try to get a better relationship of the different sections.

**U.S. MISSILES INVENTORY**

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to make the observation that in the 13 months I have been on this committee, I have been listening with great attention to what the relative strength of our country is on the missiles inventory. Mr. Secretary, in spite of the study I have made of it, I find myself in complete confusion in trying to relate the situation, and I think there ought to be clarification of this thing.

There is only one thing that I have clearly in mind now, that they have 10 intercontinental missiles on the launching pads. I thought these figures which the Senator from Alabama read dealt with the interregional missiles, but you read them too—

Senator SPARKMAN. No, the other figures I read deal with the ICBM projected to the middle of 1961. Ten are ready now, that is 10 on the pads. That does not mean they have just made 10, because there are some back in reserve and some still in the development stage.

Senator LAUSCHE. I, of course, clearly understand the arguments made that a combination of all of our strength pitted against a combination of theirs gives us a superior position.

But in trying to analyze the relative strength as intelligence shows it on these ICBM's and IRBM's, I am in confusion. Maybe that is the purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not alone. There are other people, too, so you need not be proud of that.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Delaware.

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, I am a new member of this committee and I will just ask two short questions.

The first is in line with what the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Kansas suggested. How long would the Castro regime last if we stopped all economic help to him?

Secretary HERTER. That is a very hard question to answer.

Senator WILLIAMS. Has it been considered?

**AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CUBA**

Secretary HERTER. Yes. It has been considered and, of course, last year when we did not take the excess of sugar, the Russians took it right away. They did not pay the price we paid for it, but they paid the world price for it, and I think that is a threat they are holding over our head.

On the other hand, one thing has disturbed me a good deal in trying to find out the extent to which American interests, as such, have already been injured by the actions of the Castro government. I find that in their system of trying to put interventors into American property, whether they be ranchers or sugar properties, when they actually put these people in, sometimes they act like perfect

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